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- b. The NIS Program has unquestionably stimulated and supported the collection and analysis of essential basic intelligence on most world areas. (Attach. A, Page 6, Para. 6.a.)
- c. The NIS Program, however, has reached unmanageable infeasible proportions since there is not available in being or in prospect the increased production capability required for timely revision and updating as well as for eentinued residual initial production of new NIS in the full content scope and depth which has developed in the NIS since its inception. (Attach. A, Page 3, Para. 2.b.)
- d. A-great-amount-of Unduly detailed and transitory material has been introduced into the NIS program by agencies and individual analysts in an effort to use it as the vehicle for many forms of intelligence for many different needs. The-result-has-been-delays-in production-scheduling-in-early-coverage-of-new-areas-and-in-the maintenance-of-a-reasonably-stable-accurate-and-timely-product. This has contributed to the problem of timely completion of initial coverage and concurrent adequate maintenance. (Attach. A, Page 5, Para. 5.)
- e. Among the other principal factors which have adversely affected NIS production are uncertainty-as-te-the identity-of-the-users ef-the-NIS-product, changed and expanded requirements and an increased flow of data collected against those needs, the turnover and shift of analytical personnel, problems of performing editorial and substantive review in a consistent and timely fashion, and the impact of crisis situations. (Attach. A, Page 6, Para. 6.a.)
- f. The utility of the NIS Program is also adversely affected by the-physical-bulk-of-the-individual-NIS, classification levels, academic-stylisation, and problems relating-to-the-assignment-of priorities in achieving sufficiently flexible mobilization of contributor agency capabilities to make production scheduling more responsive to changing priorities. (Attach. A, Page 5, Paras. 4.b.c.d.)

g--Deficiencies-in-the-arrangements-for-and-conduct-ofmanagerial-responsibilities-have-also-been-factors-leading-to-the Program's-present-complexity---(Attach-A-Page-3-Para-2-b-)

h. g. A-revised The NIS should be directed primarily toward meeting governmental needs for the basic intelligence required as a foundation for strategic and high-level operational planning and for the development of foreign policy. Its composition should reflect emphasis on well-rounded, up-to-date, basic and relatively static intelligence accompanied by only such detail as may be desirable-to meet-the-needs-of-such-users-regarding-the-particular-area-covered by-each-NIS required to meet valid user requirements which are not effectively served by other means. (Attach. A, Page 4, Para. 3.b.)

T-D-E-N-T-I-A-I

iv h. If the NIS Program is-redirected proceeds as indicated in paragraph hw-above g., while lower-level operational needs are met by reliance on other departmental or interdepartmental intelligence, the allocation and expenditure of the production effort for basic intelligence would be brought into better balance. (Attach. A, Page 4, Para. 3.b.)

## 5. Recommendations:

It is recommended that the United States Intelligence Board:

- a. Approve-revision-of Direct that the NIS Program proceed in accordance with the following broad principles:
- (1) The NIS Program should be redesigned concerned primarily toward with meeting governmental needs for the basic-type intelligence required as a foundation for strategic and high-level operational planning and for the development of foreign policy. It should not also-attempty-as-at-presenty be expected to meet the needs of lower-level planning and operational elements in the Armed Forces and Department of State and of all other Government agencies which require basic intelligence for the accomplishment of their missions.
- (2) The NLS should contain only that essential, relatively static basic intelligence determined to be specifically-required a valid requirement for each area covered.
- (3) Reliance should be placed primarily upon other departmental and interdepartmental intelligence production to meet needs for more detailed and specialized types of basic intelligence, including those required for lower-level operational planning.
- b. Note Direct that, eentingent-upon-USIB-approval-of-a, above, the-Geordination-Staff, assisted by the Office of Basic Intelligence of CIA and the members-of the NIS Committee, and in close consultation with interested departments and agencies, will continue to develop specific measures to implement intended to redirect the Program-in-consonance with the above-listed principles. Industry the Board thereon. Examples of the such measures, which would be eensidered should be taken at this time, are the following:
- (1) Comprehensive-revision-of-the-NIS-Standard-Instructions
  Outlines-to-eliminate-material-of-a-transitory-nadeparishable-nature,
  and-unnecessary-details-of-little-or-no-value-to-theprimary-users
  Increased selectivity in NIS Committee scheduling of NIS coverage,
  with basic reliance on a one-volume General Survey to provide the NIS
  coverage for each of most foreign areas, supplemented by only that
  more detailed NIS content needed to effectively meet valid user requirements.

(2) Elimination-of-the-following-specific-(but-not cmlusive)-elements-from-the-Standard-thetruetions.

(a)-Chapter-V±±-(Seientifie)---It-appears-that
eeverage-of-this-subjecty-ever-and-above-that-in
Section-I7-of-Chapter-Iy-ean-be-better-accomplished
by-departmental-or-interdepartmental-intelligence-with
respect-to-the-Sine-Seviet-Blocy-for-ether-areas-there
appears-little-usefulnese-in-Chapter-VII-coveragewhichy-in-any-easey-is-presently-limited-to-enly-16
countries-outside-the-Blocy

(e)-Key-Personalities--Needs-for-biographic information-should-be-met-through-the-feeilities-and services-of-GIA-and-Did-

Specific

Confining the/Scientific coverage in the NIS to a unit on this subject in each General Survey.

- (3) Eliminating Map and Chart Appraisal (heretofore covered by Chapter IX and Section 19 of Chapter I) from the N1 S.
- (4) Because of the inherent nature of this intelligence, transferring the responsibility for comprehensive biographic information from the NIS Prog ram to existing specialized facilities and services in CIA.
- (3)-Establishment-of-a-Chapter-I-(Brief)-as-the-mandatory minimum-coverage-for-any-NIS-area.
- (4)-Establishment-of-an-authoritative-central-point-to determine-and-specify,-for-each-NIS-area,-any-coverage-over and-above-Chapter-1-which-may-be-required,-either-in-terms-of-additional-chapter-or-esgments-of-chapter-or-of-modest expansion-of-sections-within-Chapter-I.
- (5)-Establishment-of-means-to-ensure-eritical-examination and-determination-of-priorities-for-the-production-of-NIS, bearing-in-mind-existing-coverage-and-the-general-availability of-information-on-the-particular-area.

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- (6) (5) Davelopment-Exploration of effective any feasible means for reducing the classification of NIS publications without impairing the validity of the product.
- (7) (6) Further exploration of Modification of responsibilities, procedures and format, and of guidance to producers as to appropriate NIS scope and depth of treatment, for the more flexible production of NIS, including the functions and responsibilities of the NIS Committee and OBI, as required to ensure coordinated implementation of the principles listed above.
- c. Direct that the agencies with NIS production responsibilities maintain the level and responsiveness of support required to adequately accomplish the NIS mission on a streamlined and accelerated basis.

/Signature/

- 4 - (continued)

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